Abstract. Many of the keystream generators which are used in practice are LFSR-based in the sense that they produce the keystream according to a rule y = C(L(x)), where L(x) denotes an internal linear bitstream, produced by a small number of parallel linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs), and C denotes some nonlinear compression function. We present an n O(1) 2 (1−α)/(1+α)n time bounded attack, the FBDD-attack, against LFSR-based generators, which computes the secret initial state x ∈ {0, 1} n from cn consecutive keystream bits, where α denotes the rate of information, which C reveals about the internal bitstream, and c denotes some small constant. The algorithm uses Free Binary Decision Diagrams (FBDDs), a data structure for minimizing and manipulating Boolean functions. The FBDD-attack yields better bounds on the effective key length for several keystream generators of practical use, so a 0.656n bound for the self-shrinking generator, a 0.6403n bound for the A5/1 generator, used in the GSM standard, a 0.6n bound for the E0 encryption standard in the one level mode, and a 0.8823n bound for the two-level E0 generator used in the Bluetooth wireless LAN system.
Introduction
A keystream generator is a finite automaton, E, determined by a set Q of inner states, a state transition function δ E : Q −→ Q, and an output function a E : Q −→ {0, 1}. The usual case is that Q = {0, 1} n for some integer n ≥ 1, n is called the keylength of E. Starting from an initial state x 0 ∈ Q, in each time unit i, E outputs a key bit y i = a E (x i ) and changes the inner state according to x i+1 = δ E (x i ). For each initial state x ∈ {0, 1} n we denote by y = E(x) the keystream y = y 0 , y 1 , . . . produced by E when starting on x.
Keystream generators are designed for fast online encryption of bitstreams which have to pass an insecure channel. A standard application is to ensure the over-the-air privacy of communicating via mobile cellular telephones. A plaintext bit stream p 0 , p 1 , p 2 , . . . is encrypted into a ciphertext bitstream e 0 , e 1 , e 2 , . . . via the rule e i = p i ⊕y i , where y = E(x). The legal receiver knows x and can decrypt the bitstream using the same rule. The only secret information is the initial state x, which is exchanged before starting the transmission using a suitable key-exchange protocol. It is usual to make the pessimistic assumption that an attacker knows not only the encrypted bitstream, but even some short piece of the plaintext, and, therefore, can easily compute some piece of the keystream. Consequently, one necessary criterion for the security of a keystream generator is that there is no feasible way to compute the secret initial state x from y = E(x). Observe that a trivial exhaustive search attack needs time n O(1) 2 n .
In this paper we suggest a new type of attack against keystream generators, which we will call FBDD-attack, and show that LFSR-based keystream generators are vulnerable against FBDD-attacks. We will call a generator to be LFSR-based if it consists of two components, a linear bitstream generator L which generates for each initial state x ∈ {0, 1} n a linear bitstream L(x) by one or more parallel LFSRs, and a compressor C which transforms the internal bitstream into the output keystream y = C(L(x)). Due to the ease of implementing LFSRs in hardware, and due to the nice pseudorandomness properties of bitstreams generated by maximal length LFSRs, many keystream generators occuring in practice are LFSR-based.
FBDD is the abbreviation for free binary decision diagrams, a data structure for representing and manipulating Boolean function, which were introduced by Gergov and Meinel in [9] and Sieling and Wegener in [16] . Due to specific algorithmic properties, FBDDs and in particular Ordered BDDs (OBDDs), a special kind of FBDDs, became a very usefull tool in the area of automatic hardware verification (see also the paper of Bryant [4] who initiated the study of graph-based data structures for Boolean function manipulation). The important properties of FBDDs are that they can be efficiently minimized, that they allow an efficient enumeration of all satisfying assignments, and that the minimal FBDD-size of a Boolean function is not much larger than the number of satisfying assignments. We show that these properties can also be successfully used for cryptanalysis. The problem of finding a secret key x fulfilling y = E(x) for a given encryption algorithm E and a given ciphertext y can be reduced to finding the minimal FBDD P for the decision if x fulfils y = E(x). If the length of y is close to the unicity distance of E then P is small, and x can be efficiently computed from P . The main result of this paper is that the special structure of LFSR-based keystream generators implies a nontrivial dynamic algorithm for computing this FBDD P .
In particular, the weakness of LFSR-based keystream generators is that the compressor C has to produce the keystream in an online manner. For getting a high bitrate, C should use only a small memory, and should consume only a few new internal bits for poducing the next output bit. These requirements imply that the decision if an internal bitstream z generates a prefix of a given keystream y via C can be computed by small FBDDs. This allows to compute dynamically a sequence of FBDDs P m , m ≥ n, which test a given initial state x ∈ {0, 1} n whether C(L ≤m (x)) is prefix of y, where L ≤m (x) denotes the first m bits of the internal linear bitstream generated via L on x. On average, the solution becomes unique for m ≥ α −1 n , where α denotes the rate of information which C reveals about the internal bitstream. The FBDDs P m are small at the beginning and again small if m approaches α −1 n , and we will show that all intermediate FBDDs have a size of at most n O(1) 2 (1−α)/(1+α)n . For all m the FBDD P m has to read the first γm bits of the keystream, where γ denotes the best case compression ratio of C. Thus, our algorithm computes the secret initial state x from the first γα −1 n bits of y = E(x). Observe that γ = α if C consumes always the same number of internal bits for producing one output bit, and α < γ if not. It holds γα −1 ≤ 2.5 in all our examples. Note that for gaining a high bitrate, α and γ should be as large as possible. Our results say that a higher bit-rate has to be paid by a loss of security.
One advantage of the FBDD-attack is that it is a short-keystream attack, i.e., the number of keybits needed for computing the secret initial state x ∈ {0, 1} n is at most cn for some small constant c ≥ 1. We apply the FBDD-attack to some of the keystream generators which are most intensively discussed in the current literature, the A5/1 generator which is used in the GSM standard, the self-shrinking generator, and the E 0 -encryption standard, which is included in the Bluetooth wireless LAN system. For all theses ciphers, the FBDD-attack has a better time behaviour than all short-keystream attacks known before. In some cases there have been obtained long-keystream attacks which have a better time behaviour. They use a time-memeory tradeoff technique suggested by Golić [8] and are based on the assumption that a long piece of keystream of length 2 dn , d < 1 some constant, is available. We give an overview on previous results and the relations to our results in section 7.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we give some formal definitions concerning LFSR-based keystream generators and present the keystream generators which we want to cryptanalyze. In section 3 FBDDs are introduced. In section 4 we derive FBDD-relevant properties of LFSR-based keystream generators. In section 5 we define the relevant parameters of LFSRbased keystream generators and formulate the main result. Our cryptanalysis algorithm is presented in section 6 and is applied to particular generators in section 7. Due to space restrictions we cannot present all proofs and BDDconstructions in this extended abstract. The complete version of this paper can be received from [11] .
At the first glance it may seem contradictory that we consider practical ciphers like the A5/1 generator with variable keylength n. But observe that definitions of LFSR-based keystream generators, even if they originally were designed for fixed keylength, can be generalized to variable keylength in a very natural way, simply by considering the internal LFSRs to have variable length. Considering variable key-length n allows to evaluate the security of ciphers in terms of how many polynomial time operations are necessary for breaking the cipher. This 'rough' way of security evaluation is sufficient in our context, since the aim of this paper is to present only the general algorithmic idea of the FBDDattack, to give a rather rough estimation of the time behaviour, and to show an inherent weakness of LFSR-based generators. For practical implementations of FBDD attacks against real-life generators much more effort has to be invested for making the particular polynomial time operations as efficient as possible, see the discussion in section 8.
Let us call a keystream generator to be LFSR-based if the generation rule y = E(x) can be written as y = C(L(x)), where L denotes a linear bitstream generator consisting of one or more LFSRs, and C : {0, 1} * −→ {0, 1} * a nonlinear compression function, which transforms the internal linear bitstream L(x) into the nonlinear (compressed) output keystream y = C(L(x)).
1 Formally, an n-LFSR is a device which produces a bitstream
on the basis of a public string c = (c 1 , . . . , c n ) ∈ {0, 1} n , the generator polynomial, and a secret initial state x = (x 0 , . . . , x n−1 ) ∈ {0, 1} n , according to the relation L i (x) = x i for 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 and
for m ≥ n. Observe that for all m ≥ 1, L m (x) is a GF(2)-linear Boolean function in x 0 , . . . , x n−1 which can be easily determined via iteratively applying (1) . A linear bitstream generator L of keylength n is defined to be an algorithm which, for some k
n for L are formed by the initial states
The motivation for taking LFSRs as building blocks for keystream generators is that they can be easily implemented using n register cells connected by a feedback channel. Moreover, if the generator polynomial is primitive, they produce bit streams with nice pseudorandomness properties (maximal period, good auto correlation and local statistics). See, e.g., the monograph by Golomb [10] or the article by Rueppel [15] for more about the theory of shift register sequences. Clearly, LFSR-sequences alone do not provide any cryptographic security. Thus, the aim of the compression function C : {0, 1} * −→ {0, 1} * is to destroy the low linear complexity of the internal linear bit stream while preserving its nice pseudorandomness properties. Many keystream generators occuring in practice are LFSR-based in the above sense. We investigate the following types of generators.
One classical construction (see, e.g., [10] and [15] ) is to combine k parallele LFSRs L 0 , . . . , L k−1 with an appropriate connection function c : {0, 1} k −→ {0, 1}. The keystream y = y 0 , y 1 , y 2 , . . . is defined via the rule
where x r denotes the initial state for L r , for r = 0 . . . , k−1. Let us call generators of this type Connect-k constructions.
The Self-Shrinking Generator was introduced by Meier and Staffelbach in [14] . It consists of only one LFSR L. The compression is defined via the shrinking function shrink : {0, 1}
2 −→ {0, 1, ε}, defined as shrink(ab) = b, if a = 1, and shrink(ab) = ε, the empty word, otherwise. The shrinking-function is extended to bit-strings of even length r as
where y i = shrink(z 2i z 2i+1 ) for i = 0, . . . , r/2 − 1. For each initial state x for L, the self-shrinking generator produces the keystream y according to y = shrink(L(x)).
The E 0 Generator is the keystream generator used in the Bluetooth wireless LAN system [3] . It is defined as
The compression is organized by a finite automaton M with external input alphabet {0, 1, 2}, state space Q = {0, 1, . . . , 15} and output alphabet {0, 1}, which is defined by an output function a : Q × {0, 1, 2} −→ {0, 1} and a state transition function δ : Q × {0, 1, 2} −→ Q. The exact specification of M is published in [3] but does not matter for our purpose and is therefore omitted.
The compression C(z) = y = y 0 y 1 . . . y m−1 of an internal bit-stream
The actual inner state is updated in each cycle according to the rule q j+1 = δ(q j , s j ), where q 0 denotes the initial state of M . In practice, the E 0 generator is used with key length 128, the four LFSRs have lengths 39, 33, 31, 25.
The E 0 Encryption Standard in the two-level mode (for short, E 2 0 -generator) of keylength n combines two E 0 devices of internal keylength N ≥ n in the following way. For x ∈ {0, 1} n it holds y = E 2 0 (x) = E 0 (z), where z denotes the prefix of length N of E 0 (u), and where
U i , i = n . . . N − 1, are public GF(2)-linear functions in (x 0 , . . . , x n−1 ). In practice, the string u results from putting n secret bits together with N − n known dummy bits into the LFSRs and running them a certain number of steps. The Bluetooth system uses N = 128, and n can be chosen as 8, 16, 32, or 64. The reason for choosing a larger internal key length N is to achieve a larger effective key length in n.
The A5/1 generator is used in the GSM standard. The definition was discovered by Briceno et. al. [5] via reverse engineering. The A5/1 generator of key-length n consists of 3 LFSRs L 0 , L 1 , and L 2 of key-lengthes n 0 , n 1 , and n 2 . In each time step i, the output key bit y i is the XOR of the actual output bits of the 3 LFSRs. A clock control decides in each timestep which of the 3 LFSRs are shifted, and which not. The clock control takes for all k ∈ {0, 1, 2} a control value c k from the N k − th register cell of L k , and computes the control value 
Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs)
For m a natural number let X m denote the set of m Boolean variables {x 0 , . . . , x m−1 }. A BDD P over X m is an acyclic directed graph with inner nodes of outdegree 2, a distinguished inner node of indegree 0, the source, and two sink nodes of outdegree 0, one 0-sink and one 1-sink. All inner nodes, i.e. nodes of outdegree > 0, are labelled with queries x i ?, 0 ≤ i ≤ m − 1, and are left by one edge labelled 0 (corresponding to the answer x i = 0) and one edge labelled 1 (corresponding to the answer x i = 1). Each assignment b to the X m -variables defines a unique computational path in P , which will be called the b-path in P . The b-path starts at the source, answers always b i on queries x i ? and, thus, leads to a unique sink. The label of this sink is defined to be the output P (b) ∈ {0, 1} of P on input b ∈ {0, 1} m . We denote by One(P ) ⊆ {0, 1} m the set of inputs accepted by P , One(P ) = {b ∈ {0, 1} m ; P (b) = 1}. Each BDD P over X m computes a unique function f : {0, 1} m −→ {0, 1}, by f (b) = 1 ⇐⇒ b ∈ One(P ). The size of P , |P |, is defined to be the number of inner nodes of P . Two BDDs are called equivalent if they compute the same function.
We call an BDD P to be a free binary decision diagram (FBDD) if along each computational path in P each variable occurs at most once. In [9] and [16] it was observed that FBDDs can be efficiently minimized with respect to all equivalent FBDDs which read the input variables in an equivalent order. The equivalence of orders of reading the input variables is expressed by using the notion of graph orderings.
Definition 1.
We need the following nice algorithmic properties of graph-driven FBDDs. Let f, g : {0, 1} m −→ {0, 1} be Boolean functions, let G be a graph ordering for X m , and let P and Q be G-driven FBDDs for f and g, respectively.
Property 3.01 There is an algorithm M IN which computes from P in time O(|P |) the (uniquely defined) minimal G-driven FBDD min(P ) for f . See, e.g., the book by Wegener [17] for a detailed description and analysis of the OBDD-and FBDD-algorithms. FBDDs together with the procedures M IN , SY N T H and SAT will be the basic data structure used in our cryptanalysis. Instead giving explicite examples of FBDDs we refer to the following relation between algorithms and FBDDs, see, e.g. [12] . Let r , labelled by x i , to P m than for all b ∈ {0, 1} the b-successor v of v is constructed as follows. If A starting on configuration r after reading x i = b stops accepting (resp. rejecting) without reading another input bit then v is defined to be the 1-sink (resp. the 0-sink). Otherwise let r denote the first configuration when A is going to read a new input bit, say x k . Then v is defined to be v j+1 r labelled by x k . 2
FBDD-Aspects of Key-Stream Generators
Let E be a LFSR-based keystream generator of key-length n with linear keystream generator L and compression function C : {0, 1} * −→ {0, 1} * . Let x ∈ {0, 1} n denote an initial state for L.
Definition 3. For all m ≥ 1 let G C m denote the graph ordering, which assigns to each internal bitstream z the order in which C reads the first m bits of z.
Observe that for the E 0 generator, the self-shrinking generator, as well as for Connect-k generators, the order in which the compressor reads the internal bits does not depend of the internal bitstream itself, i.e., G if z j+1 = y k 7.
then j := j + 2, k := k + 1 7.
else stop(0) 8. stop (1) The FBDD constructions for all the E 0 -, the E 2 0 -, and the A5/1 are sketched in section 7, resp. can be studied in the long version [11] .
We still need to estimate the size of FBDDs which decide whether a given z ∈ {0, 1} m is a linear bit-stream.
Lemma 1.
For all m ≥ n, the decision whether z ∈ {0, 1} m is generated via linear bitstream generator L of keylength n can be computed by a G For all initial states x ∈ {0, 1} n and all internal positions j, n
Let the root of R m be the node (v 0 , It can be easily checked that R m (after removing non-reachable nodes) matches all requirements of the Lemma. 2
We fix an LFSR-based keystream generator of key-length n with linear bitstream generator L and a compression function C. We assume that for all m ≥ 1 the probability that C(z) is prefix of y for a randomly chosen and uniformly distributed z ∈ {0, 1} m is the same for all keystreams y. Observe that all generators occuring in this paper have this property. Let us denote this probability by p C (m).
The cost of our cryptanalysis algorithm depends on two parameters of C. The first is the information rate (per bit) which a keystream y reveales about the first m bits of the underlying internal bitstream. It can be computed as
where Z (m) denotes a random z ∈ {0, 1} m and Y a random keystream. As the compression algorithm computes the keystream in an online manner, the time difference between two succeeding key bits should be small in the average, and not vary too much. This implies the following partition rule: Each internal bit-stream z can be divided into consecutive elementary blocks z = z 0 z 1 . . . z s−1 , such that C(z) = y 0 y 1 . . . y s−1 with y j = C(z j ) for all j = 0, . . . , s − 1, and the average length of the elementary blocks is a small constant. This partition rule implies that p C (m) can be supposed to behave as p C (m) = 2 −αm , for a constant α ∈ (0, 1]. Due to (2), α coincides with the information rate of C.
The second parameter of C is the maximal number of output bits which C produces on internal bitstreams of length m. Due to the partition rule, this value can be supposed to behave as γm, for some constant γ ∈ (0, 1]. We call γ to be the (best case) compression ratio of C.
Observe that if C always reads the same number k of internal bits for producing one output bit, then α = γ = 1 k . If this number is not a constant then α can be obtained by the formulae
where z denotes a random, uniformly distributed element from {0, 1} m . Observe that (3) yields γ ≥ α, i.e. γα −1 ≥ 1. For all x ∈ {0, 1} n and m ≥ 1 let L ≤m (x) denote the first m bits of L(x). Note the following design criterion for well-designed keystream generators.
Pseudorandomness Assumption For all keystreams y and all m ≤ α −1 n it holds that
where z and x denote uniformly distributed random elements from {0, 1} m and {0, 1} n , respectively.
Lemma 2.
If the keystream generator fulfils the above pseudorandomness assumption then for all keystreams y and m ≤ α −1 n there are approximately 2 n−αm initial states x for which C(L m (x)) is prefix of y. 2
Observe that a severe violation of the pseudorandomness assumption implies the possibility of attacking the cipher via a correlation attack. Our main result can now be formulated as Theorem 2. Let E be an LFSR-based keystream generator of key-length n with linear bit-stream generator L, and compression function C of information rate α and (best case) compression ratio γ. Let C and L fulfil the BDDand the pseudorandomness assumption. Then there is an n O(1) 2 (1−α)/(1+α)ntime bounded algorithm, which computes the secret initial state x from the first γα −1 n consecutive bits of y = C(L(x)).
As usual, we define the effective key length of a cipher of key length n to be the minimal number of polynomial time operations that are necessary to break the cipher. We obtain a bound of 1−α 1+α n for the effective key length of keystream generators which fulfil the above conditions.
The Algorithm
Let us fix n, E, L, C, α and γ as in Theorem 2. For all m ≥ 1 let G m denote the graph ordering defined by C on internal bitstreams of length m. Let y be an arbitrarily fixed keystream which was generated via E. For all m ≥ 1 let Q m denote a minimal G m -FBDD which decides for z ∈ {0, 1} m whether C(z) is prefix of y. Observe that Q m has to read the first γm bits of y. The FBDDassumption yields that Q m has polynomial size in m.
For m ≥ n let P m denote the minimal G m -driven FBDD which decides whether z ∈ {0, 1} m is a linear bitstream generated via L and if C(z) is prefix of y. Observe that by Property 3.03 and Lemma 1
The strategy of our algorithm is simple, it dynamically computes P m for m = n, . . . , α −1 n . Lemma 2 implies that for m = α −1 n with high probability only one bit-stream z * will be accepted by P m . Due to property 3.04 this bitstream can be efficiently computed. The first n components of z * form the initial state that we are searching for.
For all m ≥ n let S m denote a minimal G m -FBDD which decides for z = (z 0 , . . . , z m ) whether z m = L m (z 0 , . . . , z n−1 ). From Lemma 1 we obtain that |S m | ≤ 2|G m |. Now our algorithm can be formulated as
For the correctness of the minimization in step (3) observe that the definition of G m implies that G m is G m -driven for all m ≥ m. It follows from the definitions that for all m ≥ n P coincides with P m after iteration m.
The FBDD-operation min(P ∧ Q m ∧ S m−1 ) takes time p(m)|P m−1 | for some polynomial p. Consequently, the running time of the algorithm can be estimated by
Observe that on the one hand, by Lemma 3, |P m | ≤ p (m)2 m−n for some polynomial p , while on the other hand, by Property 3.02 and Lemma 2, |P m | ≤ m|One(P m )|, where
, where r(n) is the solution of
which yields r(n) = 1−α 1+α n. We have proved Theorem 2. 2
Applications
We apply Theorem 2 to the keystream generators introduced in section 2. We suppose that these generators fulfill the pseudorandomness assumption, otherwise the running time estimations of our cryptanalysis hold on average. It remains to determine the information rate and the compression ratio, and to prove that the FBDD-assumption is true. For the Connect-k construction it holds α = γ = 1 k . The FBDD-assumption has shown to be true in section 4. Theorem 3. For all k ≥ 2 and all stream ciphers E of key-length n which are a Connect-k construction, our algorithm computes the secret initial state x ∈ {0, 1} n from the first n bits of
This is, as far as we know, the best known general upper bound on the effective key-length of the Connect-k construction. Observe that the initial state of one LFSR can be computed efficiently if the initial states of the other LFSRs are known. This leads to a Divide-and-Conquer attack of time n O(1) 2 k−1 k n which is slightly worth than our result.
For the E 0 -encryption standard in the one-level mode we obtain α = γ = 1 4 . The decision if a given internal keystream z ∈ {0, 1} m yields a prefix of a given keystream y can be computed by π-OBDDs of linear size, see [11] , i.e. E 0 fulfils the FBDD-assumption. We obtain Theorem 4. For the E 0 -encryption standard with key-length n, our algorithm computes the secret initial state x ∈ {0, 1} n from the first n bits of
Observe that 128 · 0.6 ≈ 77. Note that the best known attacks against the E 0 generator of key length 128 were derived by Fluhrer and Lucks [7] and Canniere [6] . [7] n from the first n bits of
As far as we know this is the first nontrivial upper bound on the key length of the E 0 2 generator. Concerning the self-shrinking generator observe that for all even m and all keystreams y, shrink(z) is prefix of y for exactly 3 m/2 strings z of length m. We obtain an information rate α = 1 − log(3)/2 ≈ 0.2075 for the selfshrinking generator by evaluating the relation 2 −αm 2 m = 3 m/2 . The (best case) compression ratio of the self-shrinking generator is obviously 0.5. That the selfshrinking generator fulfils the FBDD-condition was already shown in section 4. Taking into account that for α = 0.2075 it holds 1−α 1+α ≈ 0.6563 and 0.5α −1 ≈ 2.41 we get Theorem 6. For the self-shrinking generator of an n-LFSR L, our algorithm computes the secret initial state x ∈ {0, 1} n from the first 2.41n bits of
Observe that the best previously known short-keystream attacks against the self-shrinking generator were given by Meier and Staffelbach [14] The difficulty in applying our algorithm to the A5/1 generator is that the compression algorithm reads most of the internal bits twice, one time for the clock control and a certain time later for producing an output key bit. Readtwice BDDs do not have any of the nice algorithmic properties 3.01 -3.04, unless P = N P . For making the A5/1 generator accessable to our approach we have to modify the keystream generation rule. We define the internal bitstream to be mixed of 6 LFSR-sequences L 0 , . . . , L 5 , instead of 3. The first 3 LFSRsequences are generated by the 3 LFSRs of the A5/1 generator. They are used for producing the output bits. The sequences L 3 , L 4 , L 5 are used for computing the control values. They are shifted copies of the first 3 sequences, defined by the rules L 3+k j = L k j+N k , for k = 0, 1, 2. As theses rules are linear restrictions we get a linear bitstream generated by 6 LFSRs. For this modified version, the decision if a given internal keystream z ∈ {0, 1} m yields a prefix of a given keystream y can be computed by G m -FBDDs of size O(m 3 ). G m -denotes the graph ordering induced by the clock control. This is the only example where OBDDs do not suffice, we really need FBDDs which allow different variable orderings for different inputs.
The (best case) compression ratio of the modified version of A5/1 is γ = 1 4 , as either 4 or 6 new internal bits are used for producing the next output bit. It can be proved that the information rate α is the solution of 2 1−4α = 1 4 3 + 2 2α , which yields α ≈ 0.2193, see [11] . Taking into account that 1−α 1+α ≈ 0.6403 and γα −1 ≈ 1.14 we obtain Theorem 7. For an A5/1 generator E of key length n, our algorithm computes the secret initial state x from the first 1.14n bits of y = E(x) in time n O(1) 2 0.6403n . 2
The best previously known short-keystream attack was given by Golić [8] . It is against a version of A5/1 generator with keylength 64, which slightly deviates from the specification discovered in [5] . A tight analysis of the time behaviour of Golić's attack, when applied to the real A5/1 generator, was given by Zenner in [18] and yields 2 42 polynomial time operations. We get a marginal improvement, as 64 · 0.6403 = 41. The best long-keystream attacks were given by Biryukov, Shamir and Wagner in [2] , and Biham and Dunkelman in [1] . After a preprocessing of 2 42 operations the first attack in [2] breaks the cipher within seconds on a modern PC if around 2 20 bits of keystream are available. The second attack in [2] 
Discussion
There are classical design criterions for keystream generators like a large period, a large linear complexity, correlation immunity and good local statistics. In this paper we suggest a new one: resistance against FBDD-attacks. We have seen that there are two strategies to achieve this resistance. The first is to highly compress the internal bitstream (as in the case of E 2 0 ). This implies a low bit-rate which is not desirable. The second strategy is to design the compression function C in such a way that the decision about the consistence of a given internal bitstream with a given output keystream requires exponential size FBDDs. It is an interesting challenge to look for such constructions. For demonstrating the universality of our approach we presented the FBDD-attack in a very general setting. The obvious disadvantage of this setting is that the algorithm needs a lot of space as all intermediate FBDDs have to be explicitely constructed. It is an interesting open question if the algorithmic idea of FBDD-minimization can be used in a more subtle way for getting, at least for some ciphers, an algorithm which is less space consuming. Another interesting direction of further research is to check whether the FBDD-attack could be successfully combined with other more sophisticated methods of cryptanalysis like the tradeoff attacks suggested in [8] , [2] and [1] . Moreover, it would be interesting to clarify by experiments how much do the real sizes of the minimized intermediate FBDDs deviate from the pessimistic upper bounds proved in our analysis.
